

CYNGOR SIR POWYS COUNTY COUNCIL.

AUDIT COMMITTEE

5th November 2021

CABINET EXECUTIVE

23rd November 2021

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Portfolio Holder for Finance and Transport**

REPORT TITLE: Treasury Management Quarter 2 Report

REPORT FOR: Information

1. Purpose

- 1.1 CIPFA's 2009 Treasury Management Bulletin suggested:
'In order to enshrine best practice, it is suggested that authorities report formally on treasury management activities at least twice a year and preferably quarterly.'

The CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management emphasises a number of key areas including the following:

xi. Treasury management performance and policy setting should be subject to scrutiny prior to implementation.

- 1.2 In line with the above, this report is providing information on the activities for the quarter ending 30th September 2021.

2. Background

- 2.1 The Treasury Management Strategy approved by Full Council on 25th February 2021 can be found here.

<https://powys.moderngov.co.uk/documents/s57662/Appendix%20F%20Capital%20Strategy%20and%20Treasury%20Management%20Strategy.pdf>

- 2.2 The Authority's investment priorities within the Strategy are.

- (a) the security of capital and
- (b) the liquidity of its investments.

- 2.3 The Authority aims to achieve the optimum return on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity. The risk appetite has been low in order to give priority to security of investments.

2.4 With interest rates for investments remaining extremely low the use of cash reserves as opposed to borrowing is prudent and cost-effective.

3. Advice

3.1 Investments

3.2 Short-term money market investment rates continue to remain just above zero as the Bank Rate remains at 0.10%. Given this environment and the fact that increases in Bank Rate are unlikely to occur before the end of the financial year, investment returns are expected to remain low.

3.3 When looking at temporary investing, the Treasury team consider the bank fee to set up the arrangement, because of this cost some investments are not cost effective for very short periods of time where interest rates are circa 0.01% - 0.03%. However, the Authority does not have sufficient certainty around its cashflow to lend for longer periods where the return is higher. As a result, not all available cash is currently earning interest.

3.4 The Welsh Government repayable funding the council received in March 2021 towards the Global Centre of Rail Excellence (GCRE) is currently being held in the Council's deposit account until it is required for the project. It is earning a minimal return (0.02%) which under the terms of the funding is ringfenced to be used for this scheme.

3.5 The Authority had no other investments on 30th September 2021.

3.6 Credit Rating Changes

3.7 There have been no credit rating changes relevant to this Authority's position during the last quarter.


3.8 The Authority's Capital Position

3.9 The council approved the 2021 to 2031 Treasury Management and Capital Strategy on the 25th of February 2021. This included a Capital Programme for 2021/22 totalling £101.53 million.


3.10 The revised programme at the 30th of September 2021 has increased to £106.75 million following the successfully awarding of grants and the reprofiling of budgets between financial years. As part of the Capital Review, services are being challenged on their profile of spend in year, it is likely this forecast will reduce.

3.11 Actual spend to date amounts to £25.48 million, representing only 24% of the total budget at the half year stage

3.12 Chart 1 below summarises the spend against budget.



3.13 Chart 2 below sets out how the 2021/22 capital programme is funded, 44% will be funded through borrowing, the interest cost for this is charged to the revenue account.



3.14 The Council's underlying need to borrow for capital expenditure is termed the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). This figure is a gauge of the Council's indebtedness. It represents the current year's unfinanced capital expenditure and prior years' net or unfinanced capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for by revenue or other resources.

- 3.15 Part of the Council's treasury activities is to address the funding requirements for this borrowing need. Depending on the capital expenditure programme, the finance team organises the Council's cash position to ensure that sufficient cash is available to meet the capital plans and cash flow requirements. This may be sourced through external borrowing or utilising temporary cash resources within the Council.
- 3.16 Net external borrowing (borrowings less investments) should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current year and next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years.

3.17 Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)


£'m	2020/21	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
Original Estimates 25/02/2021	422.77	468.58	509.45	534.90
Quarter 1 estimate	397.10	436.96	460.03	480.61
Quarter 2 estimate	397.10	431.17	453.27	472.40

- 3.18 The budget reprofiling into future financial years has reduced the CFR estimates as shown in the above table.

3.19 Borrowing / Re-scheduling

- 3.20 Effective management of the Authority's debt is essential to ensure that the impact of interest payable is minimised against our revenue accounts whilst maintaining prudent borrowing policies.
- 3.21 A prohibition is still in place to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three year capital programme. There are currently no schemes for yield in the Capital Programme. With the significant amounts of borrowing in the future Capital Programme, the inability to access PWLB borrowing will need to be a major consideration for any future purchases of assets for yield. The additional income these assets generate must be sufficient to cover the increased borrowing costs, as borrowing sources other than the PWLB are likely to be more expensive.
- 3.22 The Authority had outstanding long-term external debt of £347.7 million at 31st March 2021 (excluding the GCRE repayable funding). In relation to the CFR figure for 31st March 2021, this equated to the Authority being under borrowed by £49.4 million. Using cash reserves as opposed to borrowing has been a prudent and cost-effective approach over the last few years. However, members will be aware that internal borrowing is only a temporary situation and officers have advised that, based on capital estimates, it will be necessary for the Authority to borrow at stages over the next few years.

3.23 Debt Maturity Profile as at 31st March 2021.



Key Blue = PWLB; Grey = Market Loans including other local authorities; Orange = LOBOs

3.24 £21.5 million of debt has been repaid so far in 2021/22. A further £4 million of debt is maturing in quarter 3 with a further £11.5 million maturing in quarter 4. £10 million of new borrowing was required in the previous quarter

3.25 Staged repayment of the Nant Helen section 106 deposit is underway as the backfilling works on the site progress. This is also reducing the cash position of the authority, this repayment will reduce the amount the council is under borrowed.

3.26 It is unlikely that there will be sufficient resources to absorb these repayments, if this is the case then new borrowing will be required along with additional borrowing to fund the ongoing capital programme. It is currently estimated that a further £40 million will be required in this financial year, the intention is to source PWLB borrowing over the medium to long term to lock in the current interest rates.

3.27 With the changes to the MRP policy and the delayed requirement to borrow, it is likely that the revenue budget set aside to cover these costs will be underutilised in this financial year, however as demonstrated in the tables later in the report, these costs are likely to increase year on year.

3.28 PWLB Loans Rescheduling

3.29 Debt rescheduling opportunities have been very limited in the current economic climate and following the various increases in the margins added to gilt yields which have impacted PWLB new borrowing rates since

October 2010. No debt rescheduling has therefore been undertaken to date in the current financial year.

3.30 Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream

3.31 This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the Councils net revenue budget (net revenue stream). The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in the capital programme.

£'m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
From the approved Treasury Management and Capital Strategy			
Financing Costs	13.59	16.55	17.61
Net Revenue Stream	280.66	281.26	282.17
%	4.84%	5.88%	6.24%
Quarter 1 estimates (before any over provision)			
Financing Costs	11.14	13.09	14.35
Net Revenue Stream	280.66	281.26	282.17
%	3.96%	4.65%	5.08%
Quarter 2 estimates (before any over provision)			
Financing Costs	10.07	11.73	12.89
Net Revenue Stream	280.66	281.26	282.17
%	3.82%	4.17%	4.57%

3.32 The table above shows the change in the current estimates for the capital financing costs between those disclosed in the Treasury Management and Capital Strategy included as part of the 2021/22 Budget report and the updated estimates at the end of September 2021.

3.33 The decrease has been caused by two factors.

1. The updated Minimum Revenue Policy (MRP) approved by Council in March 2021 has realigned these costs more equally across the life of the assets involved.
2. The reduced borrowing requirement to support the capital programme in 2020/21 and future years. This has been the result of reprofiling of budgets into future years and funding from Welsh Government being made available earlier than anticipated. This has allowed the council to defer the date that it expected to take out additional borrowing, reducing the current interest costs, however this borrowing will still be required in the future.

The table below provides a breakdown of these changes

£'m	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
Original Estimates 25/02/2021	13.59	16.55	17.61
Change in MRP Policy	(1.75)	(3.64)	(3.68)
Change due to reprofiling/grants	(0.70)	0.18	0.42
Quarter 1 estimate	11.14	13.09	14.35
Change due to reprofiling/grants	(0.44)	(1.36)	(1.46)
Quarter 2 estimate	10.70	11.73	12.89

3.34 A principal was set in both the 2021/22 Budget and the MRP Policy Report that any benefits from the MRP change are ringfenced to support the Capital Programme to ensure the Council is beginning to address its increasing capital financing costs. As such, an overprovision of MRP will be made in line with any surplus in the revenue budget allocated to MRP to help reduce the increasing Capital Financing Requirement. Further work is being undertaken as part of the Capital Review to understand the implications of the Capital Programme and the capital ambitions of the council.

3.35 Prudential Indicators

3.36 All Treasury Management Prudential Indicators were complied with in the quarter ending 30th September 2021.

3.37 Economic Background and Forecasts

3.38 The most recent forecast of interest rates by the Authority's advisor are shown below, an increase in the rates is expected over the next few years which will increase the costs of borrowing.

Link Group Interest Rate View		29.9.21								
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75
3 month ave eamings	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70
6 month ave eamings	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80
12 month ave eamings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40

3.39 The economic background provided by our treasury advisers; Link Group is attached at Appendix A.

3.40 VAT

3.41 The Technical Section of Finance act as the authority's VAT section. VAT can pose a risk to the authority hence this report includes VAT information.

3.42 The monthly VAT returns were submitted within the required deadlines during this quarter.

3.43 Key Performance Indicators - The VAT KPI's for 2021/22 are attached at Appendix B.

4. Resource Implications

4.1 N/A

5. Legal implications

5.1 N/A

6. Data Protection

6.1 N/A

7. Comment from local member(s)

7.1 N/A

8. Impact Assessment

8.1 N/A

9. Recommendation

9.1 This report has been provided for information and there are no decisions required. It is recommended that this report be accepted.

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Appendix A

Economic Background

MPC meeting 24.9.21

- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously to leave Bank Rate unchanged at 0.10% and made no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish by the end of this year at a total of £895bn; two MPC members voted to stop the last £35bn of purchases as they were concerned that this would add to inflationary pressures.
- There was a major shift in the tone of the MPC's minutes at this meeting from the previous meeting in August which had majored on indicating that some tightening in monetary policy was now on the horizon, but also not wanting to stifle economic recovery by too early an increase in Bank Rate. In his press conference after the August MPC meeting, Governor Andrew Bailey said, "the challenge of avoiding a steep rise in unemployment has been replaced by that of ensuring a flow of labour into jobs" and that "the Committee will be monitoring closely the incoming evidence regarding developments in the labour market, and particularly unemployment, wider measures of slack, and underlying wage pressures." In other words, it was flagging up a potential danger that labour shortages could push up wage growth by more than it expects and that, as a result, CPI inflation would stay above the 2% target for longer. It also discounted sharp increases in monthly inflation figures in the pipeline in late 2021 which were largely propelled by events a year ago e.g., the cut in VAT in August 2020 for the hospitality industry, and by temporary shortages which would eventually work their way out of the system: in other words, **the MPC had been prepared to look through a temporary spike in inflation.**
- So, in August the country was just put on alert. However, this time the MPC's words indicated there had been a marked increase in concern that more recent increases in prices, particularly the increases in gas and electricity prices in October and due again next April, are, indeed, likely to lead to **faster and higher inflation expectations and underlying wage growth, which would in turn increase the risk that price pressures would prove more persistent next year than previously expected. Indeed, to emphasise its concern about inflationary pressures, the MPC pointedly chose to reaffirm its commitment to the 2% inflation target in its statement;** this suggested that it was now willing to look through the flagging economic recovery during the summer to prioritise bringing inflation down next year. This is a reversal of its priorities in August and a long way from words at earlier MPC meetings which indicated a willingness to look through inflation overshooting the target for limited periods to ensure that inflation was 'sustainably over 2%'. Indeed, whereas in August the MPC's focus was on getting through a winter of temporarily high energy prices and supply shortages, believing that inflation would return to just under the 2% target after reaching a high around 4% in late 2021, now its primary concern is that underlying price pressures in the economy are likely to get embedded over the next year and elevate future inflation to stay significantly above its 2% target and for longer.
- Financial markets are now pricing in a first increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25% in February 2022, but this looks ambitious as the MPC has stated that it wants to see what happens to the economy, and particularly to employment once furlough ends at the end of September. At the MPC's meeting in February it will only have available the employment figures for November: to get a clearer picture of employment trends, it would need to wait until the May meeting when it would have data up until February. At its May meeting, it will also have a clearer understanding of the likely peak of inflation.

- **The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -
 1. Placing the focus on raising Bank Rate as “the active instrument in most circumstances”.
 2. Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
 3. Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
 4. Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

- **COVID-19 vaccines.** These have been the game changer which have enormously boosted confidence that **life in the UK could largely return to normal during the summer** after a third wave of the virus threatened to overwhelm hospitals in the spring. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in hard hit sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels. The big question is whether mutations of the virus could develop which render current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread.

- **US.** See comments below on US treasury yields.

- **EU.** The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed economic recovery in early 2021 but the vaccination rate has picked up sharply since then. After a contraction in GDP of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%, which is likely to continue into Q3, though some countries more dependent on tourism may struggle. Recent sharp increases in gas and electricity prices have increased overall inflationary pressures but the ECB is likely to see these as being only transitory after an initial burst through to around 4%, so is unlikely to be raising rates for a considerable time.

- **German general election.** With the CDU/CSU and SPD both having won around 24-26% of the vote in the September general election, the composition of Germany's next coalition government may not be agreed by the end of 2021. An SPD-led coalition would probably pursue a slightly less restrictive fiscal policy, but any change of direction from a CDU/CSU led coalition government is likely to be small. However, with Angela Merkel standing down as Chancellor as soon as a coalition is formed, there will be a hole in overall EU leadership which will be difficult to fill.

- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of the year; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021. However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and China is now struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through sharp local lockdowns - which will also depress economic growth. There are also questions as to how effective Chinese vaccines are proving. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

- **Japan.** 2021 has been a patchy year in combating Covid. However, after a slow start, nearly 50% of the population are now vaccinated and Covid case numbers are falling. After a weak Q3 there is likely to be a strong recovery in Q4. The Bank of Japan is continuing its very loose monetary policy but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida has promised a large fiscal stimulus package after the November general election – which his party is likely to win.
- **World growth.** World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum more recently. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of **world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.
- **Supply shortages.** The pandemic and extreme weather events have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. At the current time there are major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China. Such issues have led to mis-distribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods on shelves.

Interest rate forecasts

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The PWLB rate forecasts below are based on the Certainty Rate (the standard rate minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1st November 2012.

The latest forecast on 29th September is compared below to the previous forecast on 10th May. A comparison of these forecasts shows that some PWLB rates have increased marginally and there are now three increases in Bank Rate, to end at 0.75%, instead of one to only 0.25%. However, many PWLB rates were significantly lower than forecast during the earlier part of quarter 2.

Link Group Interest Rate View		29.9.21								
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70
6 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80
12 month ave earnings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40

Link Group Interest Rate View		10.5.21										
	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.30	0.30	0.30
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.40	0.40
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50
5 yr PWLB	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50
10 yr PWLB	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, our forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*
- Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

Bank Rate is not expected to go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy has not generally taken a major hit during the pandemic, so should be able to cope well with meeting demand without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the surge to around 4% towards the end of 2021. Three increases in Bank rate are forecast in the period to March 2024, ending at 0.75%. However, these forecasts may well need changing within a relatively short time frame for the following reasons: -

- There are increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the summer and now into the autumn. This could lead into stagflation which would create a dilemma for the MPC as to which way to face.
- Will some current key supply shortages e.g., petrol and diesel, spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation. Then we have the Government's upcoming budget in October, which could also end up in reducing consumer spending power.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on around £200bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- There are 1.6 million people coming off furlough at the end of September; how many of those will not have jobs on 1st October and will, therefore, be available to fill labour shortages in many sectors of the economy? So, supply shortages which have been driving up both wages and costs, could reduce significantly within the next six months or so and alleviate the MPC's current concerns.
- There is a risk that there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front, on top of the flu season this winter, which could depress economic activity.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will need to be revised again soon - in line with what the new news is.

It also needs to be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.10% was an emergency measure to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away that final emergency cut from 0.25% to 0.10% on the grounds of it no longer being warranted and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

The current PWLB rates are set as margins over gilt yields as follows: -.

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
- **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
- **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

Gilt yields. Since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. During September, gilt yields from 5 – 50 years have steadily risen and rose further after the hawkish tone of the MPC's minutes last week. Our forecasts show a steady, but slow, rise in both Bank Rate and gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2024.

While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on gilt yields. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10 year treasury yields and UK 10 year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

US treasury yields. During the first part of the year, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a \$1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the \$900bn support package already passed in December 2020. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend further huge sums on infrastructure and an American families plan over the next decade which are caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme has enabled a rapid opening up of the economy.
2. The economy has been growing strongly during 2021.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing stimulus through monthly QE purchases.

These factors could cause an excess of demand in the economy which could then unleash strong inflationary pressures. This could then force the Fed to take much earlier action to start increasing the Fed rate from near zero, despite their stated policy being to target average inflation. It is notable that in the September Fed meeting, Fed members again moved forward their expectation of when the first increases in the Fed rate will occur. In addition, shortages of workers appear to be stoking underlying wage inflationary pressures which are likely to feed through into CPI inflation. A run of stronger jobs growth figures could be enough to meet the threshold set by the Fed of "substantial further progress towards maximum employment" for a first increase in the Fed rate.

A further concern in financial markets is when will the Fed end QE purchases of treasuries and how will they gradually wind them down. These purchases are currently acting as a downward pressure on treasury yields. In his late August speech at the Jackson Hole conference, Fed Chair Powell implied that the central bank plans to start tapering its asset purchases before the end of this year. But the plan is conditional on continued improvement in the labour market, which the August employment report suggests is proceeding more slowly than the Fed anticipated. That may mean that any announcement of tapering is pushed back, possibly even into early 2022.

As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any upward trend in treasury yields will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other

countries. Inflationary pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US compared to those in the UK, which would suggest that Fed rate increases are likely to be faster and stronger than Bank Rate increases in the UK. Nonetheless, any upward pressure on treasury yields could put upward pressure on UK gilt yields too.

There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to keep an eye on.

Significant risks to the forecasts

- COVID vaccines do not work to combat new mutations and/or new vaccines take longer than anticipated to be developed for successful implementation.
- The pandemic causes major long-term scarring of the economy.
- The Government implements an austerity programme that suppresses GDP growth.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too early – by raising Bank Rate or unwinding QE.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.
- Major stock markets e.g. in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the “moral hazard” risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market sell-offs on the general economy.
- Geo-political risks are widespread e.g. German general election in September 2021 produces an unstable minority government and a void in high-profile leadership in the EU when Angela Merkel steps down as Chancellor of Germany; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

A new era – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on ‘achieving broad and inclusive “maximum” employment in its entirety’ in the US before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that

inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.

- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be 'sustainably over 2%' and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- **For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.**
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

Appendix B

VAT - Key Performance Indicators

Creditor Invoices

VAT return for	No of high value Creditor invoices checked	No of Creditor invoices highlighted as requiring "proper" document for VAT recovery	% of creditor invoices checked requiring "proper" document for VAT recovery
Apr-21	205	0	0.00%
May-21	209	1	0.48%
Jun-21	286	1	0.35%
Jul-21	259	1	0.39%
Aug-21	189	0	0.00%
Sep-21	259	1	0.39%
Oct-21			
Nov-21			
Dec-21			
Jan-22			
Feb-22			
Mar-22			

Income Management Entries

VAT return for	No of entries checked by formula per the ledger account code used	No of entries needing follow up check (but not necessarily incorrect).	% of entries needing follow up check
Apr-21	697	0	0.00%
May-21	847	2	0.24%
Jun-21	972	4	0.41%
Jul-21	860	8	0.93%
Aug-21	869	0	0.00%
Sep-21	636	20 ¹	3.14%
Oct-21			
Nov-21			
Dec-21			
Jan-22			
Feb-22			
Mar-22			

- 1 These relate to two cash amounts, but one of them was NMWTRA which is split over many budgets so is counted per budget line for consistency with past statistics.

Debtor Invoices

VAT return for	No of Debtor invoices checked	No of checked debtor invoices with incorrect VAT code used	% of debtor invoices with incorrect VAT code
Apr-21	88	0	0.00%
May-21	82	0	0.00%
Jun-21	86	0	0.00%
Jul-21	95	0	0.00%
Aug-21	72	0	0.00%
Sep-21	193	1	0.52%
Oct-21			
Nov-21			
Dec-21			
Jan-22			
Feb-22			
Mar-22			

Note: Debtors VAT checking is carried out by Finance via a work process prior to the invoice being raised hence the improvement in errors compared to previous years

Purchase Cards

VAT return for	No of transactions for which paperwork requested for checking	Resolvable errors discovered	Value of VAT potentially claimable but recharged to budget due to non- response	No of transactions where VAT claimed incorrectly	% of transactions available to be checked where VAT was claimed incorrectly	Value of VAT incorrectly claimed hence recharged to budget
Apr-21	193	15	£2,000.55	14	7.25%	£555.26
May-21	144	5	£1,165.80	16	11.11%	£849.52
Jun-21	153	5	£1,083.04	28	18.30%	£726.18
Jul-21	123	6	£1,289.84	23	18.70%	£858.25
Aug-21	61	5	£730.68	1	1.64%	£5.00
Sep-21	151	14	£1,028.56	9	5.96%	£711.13
Oct-21						
Nov-21						
Dec-21						
Jan-22						
Feb-22						
Mar-22						

Chargebacks to service areas

The upload of appropriate documents to the Barclaycard purchase card system to enable vat recovery was made mandatory in September 2017 as a result of the lack of response from service areas/establishments to provide documents when requested. Where no document has been uploaded, any VAT amount input against the transaction is charged to the service area as there is no evidence to support the vat recovery.

Any other VAT errors that come to light as a result of the various checks are also charged to the relevant service areas.

Budget holders are able to see this clearly as chargebacks are coded to account code EX400600 and the activity code used alongside this gives the reason why this chargeback has occurred.

The total amount charged back to service areas in 2021/22 to end of September is £184,109. The breakdown of this is as follows:

Potentially correctable errors

Reason	Amount £
Not a tax invoice	3,825
Powys County Council is not the named customer	0
No invoice uploaded to purchase card system	42,516
Invoice(s) do not match payment	4,069
No evidence to back recovery	252
No Signed Authenticated Receipt	127,904
Total	178,566

Other errors

Reason	Amount £
Non-domestic VAT	45
No tax on invoice	1,661
Supply not to Powys County Council	1,794
Over-accounting for VAT	2,017
Internal payments	26
Total	5,543